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EVIDENCE
RICHARD TOUBY*
INTRODUCTION

During the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court of
Florida considered several interesting evidence problems. A general appraisal
of the court's work product with regard to these problems is that the court
is primarily concerned with justice in the case before it, rather than the
enunciation of general principles for stare decisis purposes and that the
evidence is not an end in itself, but the vehicle for the accomplishment
of an end.
The Florida Legislature during the survey period enacted legislation
dealing with registration and protection of trademarks, Florida Statutes,
section 495.02 (1957). The legislature provided that the Secretary of State
may accept as evidence that a mark has become distinctive, as applied
to an applicant's goods, proof of continuous use of a mark by the applicant
in this state or elsewhere for the five years preceding the date of filing of
the application for registration. Florida Statutes, section 18.20 (1955) was
amended by providing that the State Treasurer could photograph, microphotograph or reproduce on film all records and documents in his office;
when the statute was complied with the reproductions should have the
same force and effect as the originals and be treated as originals when
offered in evidence.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court took judicial notice that: the public has a vital interest
in the Miami Beach Hotel industry;' to have the many departments of
city government it is appropriate that office facilities be made available;2

the parking of automobiles is one of the most pressing and serious problems
confronting governmental bodies;a there are serious situations facing the
many Florida communities because of the inadequacy of their sewage
systems and the consequent financial burdens involved in remedying such
situations;4 many municipal streets in Florida constitute component parts
of the state highway system to the extent that traffic entering the city

*Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1956).

1. Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees' Union. etc., 84 So.2d 583 (Fla.
2. State v. City of Aubumdale, 85 So.2d
61! (Fla. 1956).
3. Parking Facltiiies v. Miami Beach, 88 So.Zd 141 (Fla. 1956).
4. Newport Manor v. Carmen Land Co., 82 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1955).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XII

on the state highways is channeled through municipalities to connecting
state highways at other points on municipal limits;5 modern highway rightsof-way are not confined to the pavement on which vehicles actually travel;
additional land may be and often is included for sidewalks, drainage,
separation of traffic, future expansion, and other purposes."
The court also took judicial notice that it frequently takes a legal
tribunal months of diligent searching to determine the facts of a controversial
situation.7 In determining the degree of care imposed upon the operator of
a supermarket, the court judicially noticed that customers of supermarkets
are often accompanied by children who are too young to be left at home
alone. Therefore, the intended use of a parking facility in connection with
such an establishment must necessarily contemplate the presence of children
of immature age and experience. 8
Likewise, it was held that a court should not take judicial notice of
material contained in the record of another case, unless it is brought to
the attention of the court as a part of the record.0
In Kostecos v. Johnson,' 0 a trial judge took judicial notice of the
records in a county delinquent tax proceeding and in a drainage district
foreclosure proceeding. Apparently both parties agreed to this and the
trial judge recited his agreement in the judgment; no error was assigned
on this. The court observed that:
...
. [Wle are constrained to point out that the trial court is
not authorized to take judicial notice of the records in a different
case pending or disposed of in the same court but outside the
record in the case before him . . . . The case before us illustrates
the sense of the rule.
The judgment recites that the trial judge took judicial notice of
the entire contents of the records in the two delinquent tax cases.
Undoubtedly, he could conveniently call upon the office of the clerk
of the court to bring the records before him and make them available for his examination in arriving at a judgment. Upon appeal,
however, this court is not similarly situated, and we are therefore
obviously without the information contained in the two records of
the Circuit Court of Sarasota County which may or may not have
properly constituted the basis of the summary judgment that was
entered because these records do not constitute a part of the record
on appeal unless they were appropriately introduced in evidence
either in the original or by certified copy and1 then included in the
record sent to this court for consideration.'
5. Welker v. State, 93 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1957).
6. Dade County v. Harris, 90 So.2d. 316 (Fla. 1956).
7. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
8. Jackson v. Pike, 87 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1956).
9. In ra Freeman's Adoption, 90 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1956).
10. 85 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1956).
11. Id. at 596.
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Buanuz' OF PROOF

The court, in Harnett Y. Fowler,12 re-affirmed a 1931 decree, 18 in
observing:
We do not overlook the proposition that this cause was heard
by the trial judge without a jury. We have, however, held that where
a law action is tried by the judge without a jury, a motion for
directed verdict is made and governed by the same rules and14
principles as in cases where the cause is being heard by a jury.
An argument often advanced is that if the trial judge is willing to grant a
directed verdict, there is no question how he will rule on the facts when
he is acting as the trier of fact. Nevertheless, by keeping the distinction
between the different capacities in which the trial judge is acting, both
counsel and a reviewing court should be able to determine the basis
for the trial court's judgment.
Let us suppose that the initial burden of going forward with the
evidence has been cast upon the plaintiff with regard to a certain disputed
question of fact. After the plaintiff has rested his case, what guide should
the trial judge use in granting a peremptory ruling for the defendant?
The power to direct a verdict should be exercised with a degree of caution.1"
It is well settled that a party who moves for a directed verdict admits,
for the purpose of testing the motion, the facts and evidence and, in
addition, admits every reasonable and proper conclusion based therein which
is favorable to the adverse party.16
In Brightwell v. Beem, 17 the court stated:
At the outset we are confronted with the established rule that
in considering the propriety of a directed verdict for the defendant,
the court is required to evaluate the testimony offered in the cause,
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Every reasonable intendment deductible from the evidence must be indulged in the
plaintiff's favor.' 8
In Nelson v. Ziegler,1" involving a suit by a pedestrian who was hit
by an automobile, after the evidence was presented by both parties, the
trial court withdrew the case from the jury and granted a directed verdict
for the defendant on the basis, apparently, that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The court in reversing, said:
12. 94 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1957).

13. E. E. Alley Co. v. Bail, 102 Fla. 1034, 136 So.704 (1931).
14. Harnetto v. Fowler, 94 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1957).
15. See note 12 supra.

16. Ibid.

17. 90 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956).
18. Id. at 322.

19. 89 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1956).
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A party moving for a directed verdict admits not only the facts
stated in the evidence presented, but also admits every conclusion
favorable to the adverse party that a jury might freely and reasonably infer from the evidence. It is ordinarily the function of
the jury to weigh and evaluate the evidence. This is particularly
so in negligence cases where reasonable men often draw varied
conclusions from the same evidence. In a case of this nature,
unless the evidence as a whole, with all reasonable deductions to
l)e drawn therefrom, points to but one possible conclusion, the trial
judge is not warranted in withdrawing the case from the jury and
substituting his own evaluation of the weight of the evidence?
The court has offered as a guide for directing a verdict the following
statement:
It is appropriate to dircct a verdict for the defendant only when
the evidence considered in its entirety and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom fail to prove the plaintiff's case under the
issues made by the pleading' 2'
A verdict for the defendant should never be directed by the court unless
it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that would in law
support a verdict for the plaintiff. If the evidence is conflicting or will
admit of different reasonable inferences and there is evidence tending to
prove the issue, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact
to be determined by them and not taken from the jury and passed upon
by the court as a question of law.2 -'
The court in defining "competent, substantial evidence" 2 : said:
Substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as will
establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact and issue
can be reasonably inferred. We have stated it to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to sup'' 4
port a conclusion.
Ippolito v. Brerzer,-5 involved a collision between a truck and an
automobile movig in opposite directions. The suit was by the driver and
passengers in the automobile against the driver and owner of the truck.
The defendants alleged contributory negligence. The only eye witnesses,
other than the interested witnesses to the collision, were the driver and
his wife in a car following the truck. These witnesses testified that they
could not see the automobile approaching, that therefore the automobile
was on the wrong side of the highway. The defendants contended they
should have a directed verdict. The court, in denying this contention, said,
20. Id. at 782.
21.
22.
23.
24.
23.

Homett v. Fowler, 94 So.2d 724. 725 (Fla. 1957).
Cadore v. Karp, 91 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1957).
DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 Sc.2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 916.
89 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956).
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"It is still a definite conflict of testimony in a choice of versions which is
clearly within the province of the jury."

One of the issues involved in a locomotive-automobile collision at a
railroad crossing was whether or not a warning whistle was blown.2 6 The
court stated:
I

.

. As to whether the train crew gave ample warning, it is

true that some negative testimony says 'no,' but four impartial
witnesses for the defendants testified that they saw the train
aproach the crossing and heard it blow repeated blasts. In addition
to these, the engineer and fireman both testified that the whistle
was blown repeatedly before it reached the crossing. This court is
committed to the doctrine that negative testimony will not make
an issue
in the face of positive testimony that the signals were
7
given
An ultimate fact can be established by circumstantial evidence in a
civil case, just as in a criminal case? 8
The writer believes that the two most significant cases decided by the
supreme court in the evidence field were the New Deal Cab Company v.
Stubbs,29 and Hi!kmeyer v. Latin American Air Cargo Expediters.0 In the
latter case, the court reviewed its language in the former, and properly
stated that it is important to distinguish situations where the trial judge
can properly direct a verdict and those where he can grant a new trial.
The considerations that guide the judicial discretion in directing a verdict,
and granting a new trial, on the evidence are not the same. The court
32
cited Galloway v. United States,"' a leading case on the subject.
In a case by a widow to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy,
the court determined upon whom is cast the burden of persuasion of the
trier of fact, The court said that in a civil case the burden of proof
to determine whether the widow, who had been acquitted in a criminal
trial of the murder of her husband, had unlawfully and intentionally killed

26. McAllister v. Tucker, 88 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1956). See Florida Publishing Co. v.
Copeland, 89 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1956), where the court said that there is no doubt that the
testimony of a plaintiff, although uncorroborated, if reasonable on its face and believed
.and accepted by the jury as true, can carry the burden of proof if it is made to appear
that there was adduced at the trial contrary evidence opposed thereto so strong and positive that it may be said that the verdict of the jury, approving the single witness is clearly
on the whole record against a manifest weight of the evidence considered as an entirety,
then a new trial will be granted.
27. Id. 88 So.2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1956).
28. Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, 90 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1956),
29. 90 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1956).
30. 94 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1957).
31. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
32. The Gallaway case acquires additional significance by comparing it with
Gunning v. Coaley, 281 U.S. 90 (1930).
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him would, in the first instance, rest upon the party who alleged that the
killing was intentional and unlawful.33
PRESUMPTIONS

Dacus v. Blackwell," was a suit by the heirs against the executrix of a
will; the executrix, who was also the widow, had failed to pay her share
of inheritance and estate taxes and the costs of administration of the
estate of her deceased husband. The court observed:
The orders of the probate court and returns filed by Maude
Feaster, as the co-executrix, in the probate of the estate of her
husband would appear to be the best evidence as to whether she
paid her share of the cost of administration and taxes in question.
These records are apparently still available and3 5Maude Feaster
would be estopped to deny the contents thereof.
The court was apparently treating the records as an irrebuttable
presumption of the existence of the facts contained in them.
The trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were presumed to
do their duty, hence the court could not assume that in the supervision
and disposition of submerged lands the trustees will knowingly ignore the
rights of upland owners. 5 The court should make a finding in accordance
with the presumed fact in the absence of evidence offered to the contrary.
RELEVANCY

One of the most difficult problems which faces the judge in a trial
of a law suit is ruling on the admissibility of evidence which has slight
probative value when compared with its possible undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, unfair surprise, and undue prolongation of the trial. The court,
in ruling on an objection, should take into consideration the purpose for
which the evidence is being introduced, that is whether the same fact may
easily be established by other non-prejudicial evidence and whether the
evidence is of a cumulative nature.
Loftin v. Howard,87 and Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. Ford,a8
involved suits, under the Federal Employers Liability Act, to recover for
personal injuries. During the trial of the Loftin case, evidence was admitted
of photographs designed to show the "look" of the yard. These photographs
were taken more than a year after the accident and depicted parts of the
33. Carter v. Carter, 88 So.Zd 153 (Fla. 1956). By the italicized phrase can the
court possibly mean that the burden of persuasion may shift or is the court using the
term "burden of proof" to indicate burden of going forward with the evidence?
34. 90 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
35. Id. at 328.

36. Gautier v. Lapof, 91 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956).
37. 82 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1955).
38. 92 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1956).
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yard other than where the accident took place. The court said that the
purpose of this kind of evidence was to reveal a rational picture of what
took place, or to reproduce, as near as possible, the locus of the accident.
If such evidence is in any way misleading, it should be rejected. It is a
matter of common knowledge that a railroad yard is a working place, and
that the spectacle of it changes from day to day. The photographs, having
been taken more than a year after the accident, were remote and misleading
and did not properly depict the accident scene.
In the Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. case the plaintiff claimed
injuries, caused by the use of chromate, from contact dermatitis. Evidence
was introduced as to how many employees in the defendant's entire railroad
system claimed to have occupational dermatitis during each year from 1947
through 1953. This evidence was improperly received; the court observed:
... . Evidence may be relevant and yet its relavancy may be so
slight and inconsequential that to receive it would be to distract
that attention which would be concentrated 4on
0 vital points and to
confuse, rather than to illuminate the case.
The court stated that even though this evidence might be remotely relevant
it was merely cumulative, as there was other evidence sufficient to prove
the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous propensities of Nalco (the
chromite material). The tendency of the evidence, to prejudice the jury
against defendant far out-weighed any remote evidentiary value.
The court had before it on review a conviction for murder in the
41
second degree, where the accused was convicted and judgment entered.
The questioned evidence in this case consisted of two photographs which
depicted the scene of the crime and a third photograph of the body of
the decedent taken at a funeral parlor which clearly showed the stab
wound from which he died. The accused pleaded self defense; that the
decedent had assaulted and hit her with a hammer; she claimed she struck
the decedent with a knife while she was running out of the room. The
court stated that the photographs depicting the scene of the crime were
relevant and that there was a lack of inflammatory character in them. As
to the third photograph, the court said that this was not inflammatory in
character and apparently was relevant to one of the issues involved. The
photograph showed a neat and skillful stab wound inflicted directly over
the heart of the decedent. The character and location of the wound,
clearly shown by the disputed photograph, tended to impeach the appellant's
version of the affray. It was improbable that the wound could have been
inflicted as appellant testified. Where a photograph was otherwise properly
admitted, it was not a valid objection that it tended to prejudice the jury.
39. Ibid.
40. 92 So.2d 160,166 (Fla. 1957).
41. Kitchen v. State, 89 So.2d 667 (Fl.

1956).
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A charge to a jury,' 2 and ciosing argument by counsel, 43 indirectly
involved problems of relevancy. One case is authority for the proposition
that in a malpractice suit against a physician the fact that a verdict against
the physician would result in a great injury to the professional character
and reputation of the physician is irrelevant; in the other, a suit by a
former employee against a railroad, evidence of the fact that the plaintiff
had been discharged from the defendant's service because he had filed
suit against the railroad, was held improper because irrelevant.
Ippolito v. Brener,"4 involved a collision between two vehicles. Blood
alcohol tests were taken of the passenger in the hospital immediately after
the accident; the evidence was held not material, since any degree of
sobriety on the part of the passenger could not be attributed to the driver.
In accord with the general principle that a verdict in a criminal case
is not admissible in a civil case based upon the same transaction, the
Supreme Court of Florida, 4- refused to permit into evidence a plea of
guilty to a manslaughter charge which was later withdrawn; the suit was
by a widow to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy as its beneficiary
and the contingent beneficiary offered the questioned evidence. Neither a
judgment of acquittal or guilty is admissible into evidence in the civil case,
nor a plea of guilty to manslaughter.
Ryan v. Noble," ' affirmed by Springer v,Morris,47 established the principle that evidence of liability insurance was not admissible in a personal
injury suit. In an action' against a county port authority for injuries
sustained on the authority's airport, because of an alleged dangerous condition
of the roof, evidence of an insurance policy between Dade County and its
4
insurer was properly excluded. 1
HEARSAY

Hearsay consists of an extra-judicial assertion, which is offered into
evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted.
For the purpose of showing notice or knowledge evidence that 87
employees in 19 cities or towns, in five jurisdictions including Florida,
claimed to have an occupational dermatitis, during the years 1947 through
1953 was not hearsay; the purpose of the evidence was to prove knowledge
as an "express communication" to defendant to prove that defendant "was
on notice that there was something unsafe in its shops." Evidence of an
42. Stauf. v. Holden, 94 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1957).
43. See note 26 supra.
44. 89 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956).
45. Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1956).
46. Ryan v. Noble, 195 Fla. 830, 116 So. 766 (Fla. 1928).
47. Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954).
48. Rose v. Peters. The court cited Carl's Markets, Inc., v. Meyers, 82 So.2d 585
(Fla. 1955).
49. 69 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
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express communication to prove that a person charged with negligence
had notice of the dangerous condition of a machine or place it not hearsay. "
For the purpose of establishing notice or knowledge, the evidence is introduced for the purpose of establishing the fact that the matter was asserted,
rather than the fact of the truth of the matter asserted; it is not, therefore,
hearsay.
St. Germain v. Carpenter,' involved an automobile intersection collision cas where the driver of defendant's automobile died shortly after
the accident. Plaintiff had a conversation with the decedent following the
accident, but was not permitted to testify as to the decedent's statement.
The court said:
. . . Appellants contend that the exclusion of this evidence was
error. The record shows, however, that an insufficient foundation
was laid for the reception of this evidence, as part of the res
gestae, in that the extent of the time interval between the accident
and the statements at the hospital were not made clearly to appear.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statements sought to be introduced in evidence were not explored. Since
the case must be remanded for a new trial, the plaintiffs will have
another opportunity to lay a foundation in order that the trial
court may determine accurately whether or not the statement may
be received as part of the res gestae.z-2
It is difficult for the writer to understand why courts persist in the
use of the term res gestate. Apparently the court in the instant case was
thinking about the "exercised utterance" exception to the hearsay rule. It
is suggested that another possible basis for admission of the questioned
evidence is the "declaration against interest" exception to the hearsay rule,
for it may very well be that the declaration was against the pecuniary
interest of the declarant, who is now deceased.
Kaplan v. Roth,5* was an automobile collision suit to recover damages
for personal injuries. The complaint charged that the accident was caused
by the negligence of an agent of the defendant. The answer denied the
negligence on the part of the defendant or his agent. In the course of
the investigation of the accident by police officers, the driver of the
defendant's automobile admitted that he was at fault for the accident.
Later, at a hearing in the police court, the agent again admitted responsi50. Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Ford, 92 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1956).
51. 84 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
52. Id. at 558. From the plaintiff's attorney it was learned that the conversation
between the deceased and Plaintiff was in the emergency room of a hospital fifteen ,inn-

utes after the accident and that the decedent told the plaintiff that she had run through
a stop sign by putting her foot on the gas instead of the brake. At the re-trial, the evi-

dence was again excluded by the trial judge. Hlowever, the plaintiff received a verdict.
The ruling by the trial judge is clearly erroneous, since the evidence is admissable under
two exceptions to the hearsay rule, both as an excited utterance, and as a declaration
against interest.

53. 84 So,2d 559 (Fla. 1956).
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bility for the accident and pleaded guilty to a reckless driving charge. The
agent died before the action commenced; the defendant had not been
present when any of these proceedings took place. The trial court admitted
these conversations in evidence over the objection of the defendant. The
court observed that the admissions were not made in the defendant's
presence and were beyond the scope of the agent's authority. The court
concluded that the judgment of conviction in a criminal case, as well as
any question directed to the defendant during the course of the civil trial
relative to his conviction in the criminal case growing out of the accident,
should not be introduced into evidence. The admission made to the police
officer investigators was held to be within the privilege of Florida Statutes
section 317.17 (1957).
What is the significance of the fact that the declarations of the agent
were not made in the defendant's presence? Would the court then have
considered the evidence admissible as an admission by the defendant
through his failure to respond to an accusation? It is submitted that the
defendant's presence or absence at the time of the agent's admissions' is
not material in this type of factual situation.5 4
An extra-judicial testimonial admission by a party is admissible into
evidence under the admission of party opponent exception to the hearsay
rule. Ordinarily such an admission even though one inconsistent with
the party's position in the law suit, is considered the same as any other
evidence and does not have a binding or precluding effect. In an action
by a lumber supplier against a wholesale dealer for the invoice price of
one car of lumber, a question arose as to which of two rules of the Southern
Cypress Manufacturers Association was applicable. The court made the
statement that nowhere in the certificate of inspection is it indicated that
there is any complaint based upon a shortage of quantity. "This was
appellant's own evidence and he is bound by it (emphasis added), and we,
therefore, find that on the basis of this record, SCMA Rule 42 governs." 55
Although, since this evidence appears to be the only evidence before the
court concerning the disputed question of fact, the court was not in error
in coming to the conclusion that it did. The writer wonders whether the
case can be taken as authority for the proposition that the testimonial
admission of a party, whether before the court or extra-judicial, is to be
considered as binding against the party making it.
BEST EvIDElNCE RULE

Where a party seeking to establish a fact voluntarily destroyed the
writing constituting the best evidence, he could not introduce secondary
evidence, especially where the suit was in his own behalf and was founded
54. See Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 193 P. 251 (1920).
55. McNeill v, Jack, 83 So.2d 704, 706 (Fla. 1955).
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upon the writing; first it was necessary to introduce evidence to explain the
destruction of the writing to repel all inference of fraudulent design. 56
PMV-iEG9

By statute, Florida has a certified public accountant and client
privilege.57 In construing this statute, the court observed that the privilege
belongs to the client and he can waive it. Where a party has filed a claim
based upon a privileged matter, and the proof will necessarily require that
the privileged matter be offered in evidence, the client has waived his right
to insist in pre-trial discovery proceedings that the matter is privileged.5 8
The privilege created by Florida Statutes section 317.17 (1957), making
accident reports confidential, extends to cross-examination of a witness called
by the opposite party.
In a negligence action, the rule that an attorney cannot be compelled
to divulge a communication made to him by his client without the consent
of the client, "does not extend to information which an attorney secures
from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." Nor
can the information be withheld from the attorney. Under this rule, the
attorney would be required to supply the names and addresses of witnesses
known to the attorney who have knowledge concerning the facts.60
In Vann v. State,"1 the court adopted the position that:
.... According to the weight of authority, a report or other communication made by insured to his liability insurance company
concerning an event which may be made the basis of a claim against
him, covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as being
between attorney and client, if the policy required the company to
defend him through its attorney, and the communication is intended for the information or assistance of the attorney in so
defending him.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

The scope of cross-examination was reconsidered in a recent criminal
case.62 In a prosecution for uttering a worthless check the state's sole witness
testified on direct examination as to a "business arrangement" with the
defendant. The defendant was convicted and on appeal argued that the
trial court precluded cross-examination by him as to the arrangement. The
court, after observing that the record did not justify the conclusion reached,
stated that the transcript showed that the defendant was permitted to go
into the business arrangement on cross-examination and that "if he wanted
56. In re McCollum's Estate, 88 So.2d 537 (F1a. 1956).
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

§ 473.15 (1957).
Savino v. Luciano, 92 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1957).
Ippolito v. Brener, 89 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1956).
Dupree v. Better Way, 86 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1956).
85 So.2d 133, 138 (Fla. 1956). The Court quoted from 22 A.L.R. 2d *59, 660.
Shargaa v. State, 84 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1955).
FLA. STAT.
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more he should have made the prosccuting witness his own." We can
conclude, that in a criminal case cross-examination of the prosecuting witness
is limited to matters brought out on direct examination and is not coextensive with the issues.
In Tucker Brothers, Inc. v.Menard, 3 the court interpreted Rule 1.37

(a) Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 04 A witness who was the corporate
representative at the trial and who was permitted to remain in the courtroom and advise with the attorneys for the defendants on the handling
of the case was within the rule, It is sufficient if he is the managing
representative of the corporation in connection with the particular matter
under consideration.
Impeachment is a proper function of cross-examination. Conviction
of a crime is a proper ground of impeachment. This ground of impeachment may have harsh results in the case of an accused in a criminal case
who elects to take the stand.
Mead v. State,05 involved an indictment for grand larceny. The defendant was asked by his attorney if lie had "ever been convicted," and
he replied that he had "been convicted in the military service." The
prosecuting attorney began the cross-examination of the defendant and
persistently questioned him with reference to the relative periods the defendant had spent in the guardhouse and in performing his duties as a
soldier; this was over the objection of the defendant's attorney. The court
held that once the defendant became a witness, he could be examined
the same as any other witness about matters that would illuminate the
quality of his testimony and in the process he could properly be asked
about his former convictions of "crime." The court observed that the
evidence of conviction of other crimes might well affect the credit the
jury would give to his story and said that it is a rule that a witness may
be asked if he has been convicted of a crime. However, the inquiry must
stop there unless the defendant denies a conviction, in which case the
opposing party may produce the record of conviction. In any event, the
matter may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime when the
defendant admits it. Such a course would result in abuse of the rule to
the disadvantage of the defendant.
Smith v. State,00 involved a criminal prosecution in which the accused
was convicted of manslaughter. A witness for the accused testified on

direct examination; on cross-examination the prosecuting attorney .questioned the witness on an inconsistent statement made to the State Attorney
63. 90 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1956).

64. The Rule provides that a party may call as a witness an officer, director, and
managing agent of a corporate adverse party and interrogate him by leading questions
and contradict or impeach him in all respects as if he had been called as an adverse

party. See also Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1956).
65. 86 So.2d 773 (Fla. 1956).
66. 95 So,2d 525 (Fla. 1957).
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after he had been called to the State Attorncy's office. The court held
that this was not a private paper or memorandum; it was error to allow
the State Attorney to use this transcript for the purpose of impeaching
the witness without allowing the witness and the defendant's counsel to
inspect the transcript and introduce it into evidence for the purpose of
explaining the alleged inconsistencies.
That impeachment of a witncss does not destroy the witness's testimony
as a matter of law was exemplified in a recent Florida case. " A witness
for the prosecution was a bookkeeper who testified that she gave accused
$1500.00. The accused denied receipt of this moncy. It was shown that
the witness had been promised immunity from prosecution by the state,
but the court said that this did not make her testimony incredible as a
matter of law and the testimony of the witness and accused presented an
issue which the jury could resolve against the accused.
CoMprTENCY OF WITNESS

A father was convicted of rape of his nine year old daughter.,, The
conviction depended upon the testimony of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix,
who was nine years old was still in the first grade in school. She had not
been taught the difference between telling lies and the truth. She had
never gone to church, nor did she know what an oath was. However, she
was told that she would go to the penitentiary if she told a "story." The
court said:
The prime test of competency of a young child is his intelligence,
rather than his age. In addition, the infant witness should possess
a sense of obligation to tell the truth. Sensibility to this moral
obligation under oath is one of the turning factors. Fear of ternporaI punishient must be considered as producing a sword of
compulsory veracity. However, we lean to the view that there is
really no substitute for the spiritual and moral consciousness that
should be the basic inducement to all witnesses to speak the truth. 9
'he court further observed that:
Ve are aware of our numerous decisious which accord to the trial
Judge a very broad discretion in determining the competency of
witnesses. It is not, however, a discretion without bounds. It is
a sound judicial discretion subject to appellate review.
The appellate court reversed and granted a new trial; the court did not
state, however, that the trial iudgc erred indetermining that the prosecutrix
was incompetent as a witness.
A person who has been convicted of perjury ii not competent as a
witness in Florida. In Lefcourt v. Streit, 6 a question arose as to whether
67. Ewing v. State, 81 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1955).
68. Bell v. State, 93 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
69. Id. at 577.
70. 91 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1957).
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or not the plaintiff would be permitted to testify on his own behalf after
he had been convicted of perjury in New York. The court held that the
plaintiff was competent to testify as a witness in his own behalf, notwithstanding that the statute provided that conviction of perjury made any
person incompetent to testify in any court in Florida.
Two new cases were decided involving the "'dead man's statute."'" The
Small case is worthy of detailed study by counsel preparing a case for
trial. It shows how a party may inadvertently waive the privilege, provided
by the statute, when such a waiver is unnecessary and may be highly
detrimental to his cause.
ADMIssION AND ExcLusioN

Ordinarily, a timely objection must be made to the admissibility of
objectionable evidence in order to preserve the right to appeal, and this
is also true of counsel's prejudicial remarks. However, in a recent Florida
case,72 the court said that:
While we are committed to the rule that in the ordinary case,
unless timely objections to counsel's prejudicial remarks are made,
this court will not reverse the judgment on appeal, however, this
ruling does not mean that if prejudicial conduct of that character
in its collective impact of numerous incidents, is so extensive that
its influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing the calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the
jury the court would not afford redress.
A party does not preserve his right to appeal, when he asks a question,
it is objected to, and the objection sustained when the party does not
make clear to the trial judge what the answer would have been to the
question and that for the purpose for which it was offered the question
was not subject to objection?'
In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, where the case was tried
without a jury, the trial judge apparently does not have to discriminate with
regard to the admissibility of evidence to the extent that he must in cases
tried with a jury. In the First Atlantic National Bank v. Cobbett,74 the
court said, "We do not find that the evidence objected to injuriously or
harmfully affected appellant when considered and evaluated by an experienced trial judge."
A defendant, offering no testimony in his own behalf except his own
is entitled to the concluding argument before the jury. 5 A photograph was
considered to constitute "testimony" within the meaning of this statute."6
71.
v. Lance,
72.
73.
74.
75.
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